First Impressions
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of issues of first impression
identified by a federal court of appeals opinion announced between
September 1, 2006, and January 31, 2007. This collection is organized by
circuit.
Each summary presents an issue of first impression, a brief
analysis, and the court’s conclusion. It is intended to give only the
briefest synopsis of the first impression issue, not a comprehensive
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point. If a circuit
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FIRST CIRCUIT
Maine People’s Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277 (1st Cir.
2006)
QUESTION: Whether the citizen suit provision in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) § 7002(a)(1)(B), which
“allows citizens to sue persons or firms whose handling of solid or
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hazardous waste ‘may present an imminent and substantial endangerment
to health or the environment,’” should be construed broadly to provide a
cause of action for claims based on a reasonable prospect of “medical or
scientific concerns.” Id. at 286.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit first acknowledged that “at least four of
our sister circuits have construed [the relevant] provision expansively,”
and approvingly noted that the district court’s analysis “follow[ed] the
interpretive trail blazed by the four above-mentioned courts of appeals.”
Id. at 288-89. The court cited legislative history of the RCRA, which
stated that the relevant section was passed “with the avowed intention of
closing ‘the last remaining loophole in environmental law, that of
unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous waste.’”
Id. at 287. The court analyzed the decisions of its sister circuits and
found convincing the legislative history arguments that those decisions
were based upon. Id. The court considered the defendant’s textual
argument that the plain meaning should control the day but concluded
that “the interpretive question before us cannot be resolved favorably to
Mallinckrodt on the basis of plain meaning alone.” Id. at 290. The court
also disposed of defendant’s separation of powers argument which
argued that the court was overstepping the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (“EPA”) powers by providing a judicial remedy for merely
speculative damages. Id. The court reasoned that “this is not a situation
in which a court has presumed to grant relief that flies in the face of an
express EPA authorization of certain conduct” because the EPA has
never “so much as hinted that correction of the Plant’s effects on
downriver pollution is bad policy.” Id. at 292.
CONCLUSION: The court found that the probabilistic language of
the section “leads us to conclude that a reasonable prospect of future
harm is adequate to engage the gears of RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) so long
as the threat is near-term and involves potentially serious harm. The
language, structure, purpose, and legislative history of the provision will
not comfortably accommodate the more restricted reading that
Mallinckrodt espouses.” Id. at 296.
Rucker v. Lee Holding Co., 471 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether and under what circumstances an employee
who has had a break in service may count previous periods of
employment with the same employer toward satisfying this 12-month
requirement” to qualify for protection under the Family and Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. Id. at 7-8.
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ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit first looked to the statutory language of
the FMLA and determined that “there is no such statutory clarity
expressing unambiguous intent” to define the meaning of ‘has been
employed . . . for at least 12 months by the [relevant] employer.’” Id. at
10. The court considered various canons of statutory interpretation as
well as the legislative history of the FMLA and determined that
“‘Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,’ and
. . . deference to a reasonable agency interpretation is appropriate.” Id. at
11. The court found that Congress had “specifically instructed the
D[epartment] O[f] L[abor] to ‘prescribe such regulations as are necessary
to carry out [the FMLA].’” Id. Then the court turned to the DOL
regulations for guidance, noting that “if the DOL regulation at 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.110(b) clearly resolves this case, and is reasonable, that would be
the end of the matter.” Id. The court noted that “[w]hen interpreting an
agency regulation, courts must give substantial deference to the agency’s
own interpretation of its regulations, so long as that interpretation is
consistent with the regulation and ‘reflect[s] the agency’s fair and
considered judgment on the matter in question.’” Id. at 12. The court
found that “the DOL did not believe its regulation would prevent
employees from relying on previous periods of employment even after a
break measured in years.” Id. Furthermore, the court found “the DOL’s
interpretation of its regulation [to be] reasonable, and that [the]
regulation, so interpreted, is a reasonable exercise of the DOL’s statutory
authority.” Id. at 13.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit held that “consistent with the DOL
regulation . . . we hold that the complete separation of an employee from
his or her employer for a period of years, here five years, does not
prevent the employee from counting earlier periods of employment
toward satisfying the 12-month requirement.” Id.
Velez v. Janssen Ortho, L.L.C., 467 F.3d 802, 803 (1st Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hat prima facie showing is necessary to establish
an adverse employment action, within the meaning of Title VII, when a
plaintiff alleges a retaliatory failure-to-hire.” Id. at 803.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis with the language of “Title
VII, which prohibits an employer from ‘discriminat[ing] against any of
[its] employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has . . . participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.’” Id. at 806.
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In surveying the opinions of other circuits regarding the elements of a
prima facie case for adverse employment action in the retaliatory failureto-hire context, the court found those circuit required the plaintiff to
prove “‘that he applied for an available job; and . . . that he was qualified
for that position.’” Id. at 807. The court recognized that “[p]recedent in
the analogous context of failure-to-promote claims also reflects the
requirement that plaintiffs asserting discriminatory retaliation must show
that they applied for a specific vacant position for which they were
qualified, and that they did not get the job.” Id. Finally, the court
concluded its analysis by noting that the sensibility and fairness of this
rule. Id. “A failure-to-hire claim obviously depends on the availability of
a job opening. It is not unfair or unduly burdensome to expect a plaintiff
to submit an application for that vacancy as a prerequisite for stating a
failure-to-hire claim.” Id. at 808.
CONCLUSION: “[A] plaintiff asserting a Title VII claim of
retaliatory discrimination based on a failure-to-hire must, in order to
establish an adverse employment action, make a prima facie showing
that (1) she applied for a particular position (2) which was vacant and (3)
for which she was qualified . . . [and] that she was not hired for that
position.” Id. at 809.
Subsalve USA Corp. v. Watson Mfg., Inc., 462 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether a court charged with determining whether an
order is for a dismissal or a 28 U.S.C.S. § 1631 transfer can also decide
the substance of the order. Id. at 47.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that all other circuits have decided that
this type of transfer order cannot be immediately appealed. Id. The court
explained that, with few exceptions, the final judgment rule applies. Id.
The court then described the standard for that rule as a decision that
“ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do
but execute the judgment.” Id. A transfer order, on the contrary, allows
the matter to continue in another forum. Id.
CONCLUSION: The appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the
substantive claim that the district court erred in its conclusion that it
could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Id.
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McKenna v. First Horizon Home Loan Corp., 475 F.3d 418 (1st Cir.
2007)
QUESTION: “[W]hether [Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et
seq.] claims focused on rescission are maintainable in a class-action
format.” Id. at 423.
ANALYSIS: The 1st Circuit started its analysis by describing the
purpose of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and the various remedies
available pursuant to it. Id. at 421. The court noted that “TILA requires
creditors to disclose, clearly and accurately, all the material terms of
consumer credit transactions.” Id. Failure to comply with TILA will
result in liability requiring the lender to pay damages or grant rescission.
Id. Next, the 1st Circuit looked to the legislative intent behind TILA and
determined that “Congress did not intend rescission suits to receive classaction treatment.” Id. at 423. The court analyzed the structure and
language of TILA and pointed out that class actions were “specifically
addressed in the section of the TILA relating to damages . . . however, no
comparable mention of the class-action mechanism [exists] in the section
that deals with rescission.” Id. The court found this strongly suggestive
that “Congress did not intend to include a class-action mechanism within
the compass of section 1635 [which deals with rescission].” Id.
Additionally, the court recognized the potentially devastating financial
effect on a creditor faced with rescission as a remedy in a class action:
“Congress made manifest that although it had designed the TILA to
protect consumers, it had not intended that lenders would be made to
face overwhelming liability for relatively minor violations.” Id. at 424.
Finally, the court found that the “personal nature of the rescission
remedy gives this legislative history a compelling quality. . . . [T]he
range of variations that may occur render rescission largely incompatible
with a sensible deployment of the class action mechanism.” Id. at 42425.
CONCLUSION: The 1st Circuit sided with the 5th Circuit on this
issue and held that “class certification is unavailable as a matter of law
for TILA rescission claims.” Id. at 427.
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SECOND CIRCUIT
Islander E. Pipeline Co., L.L.C. v. Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 467
F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the “order of the State of Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection (CTDEP) denying Islander East
Company’s application for a Water Quality Certificate (WQC) for
discharge into the waters of the Long Island Sound[]” should be
overturned “pursuant to . . . [the 2005 amendment to section 19(d) of] the
Natural Gas Act of 1938 (NGA), 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2000).” Id. at 299.
ANALYSIS: The court found that section 19(d) of the NGA provided
natural gas companies such as Islander East Company “with a cause of
action in federal court to challenge an agency’s order, action, or failure to
act with respect to permits necessary for the construction or operation of
natural gas projects.” Id. at 300. The court rejected CTDEP’s claims that
section 19(d) violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments’ guarantees
of state sovereignty, and ruled that section 19(d) applied retroactively to
CTDEP’s actions. Id. at 304-09. The court determined that under section
19(d), a federal court’s review of an action by a state agency should use a
two tiered standard. Id. at 309-10. The court held that the first step
should be to ascertain that “the state agency complied with the
requirements of the relevant federal law.” Id. at 309. The court next
found that aid that if the first tier is satisfied, the second tier should be to
review the state action “under the arbitrary and capricious standard.” Id.
at 310.
CONCLUSION: The court found that although it complied with
relevant federal law, CTDEP’s denial of Islander East Company’s
application was arbitrary and capricious because CTDEP “failed to
articulate rational connections between the facts in the record and the
bases for its decision.” Id. at 311.
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of WorldCom, Inc. v. SEC, 467
F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether “the ‘fair and reasonable’ standard for
disgorgement plans . . . adopted in SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.
1991),” should be applied to Fair Fund distribution plans created
pursuant to “Sarbanes-Oxley’s Fair Fund provision,” and whether the
circuit court should apply the abuse of discretion standard to the district
court’s application of the “fair and reasonable” standard. Id. at 82, 84.
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ANALYSIS: The court “explained that the SEC is charged by statute
with enforcing the securities laws, and therefore we would defer to its
‘experience and expertise’ in determining how to distribute the funds.”
Id. at 82. The court reasoned that a “fair and reasonable” standard was
appropriate for SEC-administered Fair Fund distribution plans because
“[w]e have long understood that the SEC’s charge to enforce the
securities laws carries with it the discretion to determine how to
distribute recovered profits among injured investors.” Id. at 84. The court
held that since it had established an abuse of discretion standard of
appellate review for district court applications of the “fair and
reasonable” standard in the analogous situation of disgorgement plans, it
would use an abuse of discretion standard for Fair Plan distributions as
well. Id.
CONCLUSION: “[T]he same ‘fair and reasonable’ standard of
review that applies to the SEC’s distribution of disgorged profits applies
to its distribution of civil penalties pursuant to the Fair Fund
provision[,]” and the 2nd Circuit’s “review of the district court’s exercise
of its equitable powers in approving the plan is for abuse of discretion.”
Id. at 82, 84.
United States v. Sloley, 464 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “On what basis can a defendant [convicted of crime]
challenge a prosecutor’s refusal to file a § 3E1.1(b) motion [under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.)]” to reduce the
defendant’s sentence. Id. at 360.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit turned to “case law governing
[U.S.S.G.] § 5K1.1 that grants analogous discretion to prosecutors in
filing motions that permit a court to decrease a sentence” for guidance in
determining when a prosecutor may withhold the motion to decrease a
sentence under § 3E1.1(b). Id. The court found that “[i]t is subject, . . . to
the same limits to which a prosecutor’s discretion under § 5K1.1 is
subject. That is in all cases, a prosecutor cannot refuse to move on the
basis of an unconstitutional motive, such as a defendant’s race or
religion.” Id. The court also stated that since the discretion to file the
motion is “solely in the hands of the government, . . . we may review the
plea agreement to see if the government has ‘made its determination in
good faith.” Id. at 361.
CONCLUSION: The court found that there was no unconstitutional
motive behind the prosecutor’s decision. “The record shows that
[defendant’s] reneging on his admission to perjury . . . is what led the
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government to conclude that he had not accepted responsibility to the
prosecutor’s satisfaction.” Id. The court also found that “the
government’s refusal to file was made in good faith. The record shows
that the prosecutor was honestly dissatisfied with appellant’s acceptance
of responsibility.” Id.
Moreno-Bravo v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the [REAL ID] Act compels this Court, as
a matter of jurisdiction, to transfer the case to the circuit where the
alien’s immigration proceedings were held—here the Fifth Circuit.” Id.
at 255.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit found that the answer would turn on
“whether [8 U.S.C.] § 1252(b)(2) is a venue provision or a jurisdictional
mandate.” Id. at 257. The court explained that “[w]hereas issues of
jurisdiction relate to the basic authority of a court to hear and decide a
case, venue, by contrast, is in the nature of a convenience to litigants and
subject to their disposition.” Id. at 258. Thus, if § 1252 were merely a
venue provision, transfer is not compelled by the statute. Id. Using
principles of statutory interpretation, the court found it hard “to believe
that the legislature would then neglect to express a similarly clear
intent—or any intent at all—to circumscribe jurisdiction when it came to
defining the circuit locality of filing such petitions as set forth by §
1252(b)(2).” Id. at 259.
CONCLUSION: The court found that “§ 1252(b)(2) is a venue
provision, not a jurisdictional one. We therefore are not compelled to
dismiss or transfer the petition, and in the circumstances here presented,
we decline to do so.” Id. at 262.
DiTolla v. Doral Dental IPA, L.L.C., 469 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether by the enactment of the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Congress intended to change the long-standing
tradition that the party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of
proving that the case is properly in federal court. Id. at 275.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that, absent an explicit direction by
Congress to the contrary, “it would be thoroughly unsound for [the c]ourt
to reject a longstanding rule.” Id. The court explained that Congress
knew at the time it enacted CAFA where the burden of proof lay and
from its silence it can be inferred that Congress chose not to alter the
rule. Id.
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CONCLUSION: The enactment of CAFA does not alter the rule that
the party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden to prove that the
case is properly in federal court. Id.
Atsilov v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the circuit court has jurisdiction to review the
Attorney General’s decision to deny a hardship waiver to an alien who
has established one of the three grounds for relief under § 1186a(c)(4).
Id. at 115.
ANALYSIS: Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the court noted,
courts do not have jurisdiction to review any decision or action that is
under the discretion of the Attorney General granted by subchapter II of
chapter 12 of Title 8 of the United States Code. Id. Congress, under §
1252(a)(2)(D), reserved for the courts jurisdiction to review
constitutional claims or questions of law, including whether the Attorney
General failed to grant a request if one was required by § 1186a(c)(4). Id.
The court noted that “the statute provides that if certain conditions are
established, the Attorney General ‘in [his] discretion’ ‘may’—not
‘shall’—grant the waiver. . . . [Such language] specifies that an ultimate
decision whether to grant relief is entrusted to the discretion of the
Attorney General, thus invoking the jurisdictional bar of §
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).” Id. at 116.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) deprives
[the court] of jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s discretionary
decision under § 1186a(c)(4) to deny relief to an alien who is eligible for
relief under the terms of that subsection.” Id. at 116.
Augustin v. Jablonsky, 461 F.3d 219 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “Whether a court may employ Rule 23(c)(4)(A) to
certify a class as to a specific issue where the entire claim does not
satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.” Id. at 226.
ANALYSIS: The court held that the plain language and structure of
the statute support that “[e]ven if the common questions do not
predominate over the individual questions so that class certification of
the entire action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in
appropriate cases to isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A)
and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.” Id. The court
further determined that the Advisory Committee Notes support this
conclusion, “[f]or example, in a fraud or similar case the action may
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retain its ‘class’ character only through the adjudication of liability to the
class; the members of the class may thereafter be required to come in
individually and prove the amounts of their respective claims.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held “that a court may employ
subsection (c)(4) to certify a class as to liability regardless of whether the
claim as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.”
Id. at 227.
Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the court has “jurisdiction under the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 to stay an order of
voluntary departure issued by an immigration judge or the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. at 324.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “in reviewing orders of federal
agencies, ‘the court of appeals in its discretion may restrain or suspend,
in whole or in part, the operation of the order pending the final hearing
and determination of the petition.’” Id. at 329.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. §
2349(b), as incorporated by reference in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), the court
has the authority to stay an agency order pending consideration of a
petition for review on the merits, and that nothing in the Immigration and
Nationality Act or its implementing regulations strips the court of this
authority with respect to orders of voluntary departure. Id. at 332..
Ofori-Tenkorang v. Am. Int’l Group Inc., 460 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether Congress extended the coverage of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 29798.
ANALYSIS: The court began with the legal presumption that
Congress makes laws for domestic purposes, not extraterritorial ones. Id.
at 301. The court then reasoned that the plain language of § 1981
unambiguously conferred these rights only within the borders of the
United States. Id. The court also looked to the legislative history and
structure in determining that nothing existed that conferred these rights
outside of the United States. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 2nd Circuit affirmed the holding of the district
court dismissing plaintiff’s § 1981 claims to the extent that those claims
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arose from alleged discriminatory conduct that occurred while plaintiff
was living and working in South Africa. Id. at 227.
Pritchard v. County of Erie, 473 F.3d 413, 416 (2d Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether the attorney-client privilege protects
communications that pass between a government lawyer having no
policymaking authority and a public official, where those
communications assess the legality of a policy and propose alternative
policies in that light. Id. at 417.
ANALYSIS: The court found that “[]when a lawyer has been asked
to assess compliance with a legal obligation, the lawyer’s
recommendation of a policy that complies (or better complies) with the
legal obligation—or that advocates and promotes compliance, or
oversees implementation of compliance measures—is legal advice.” Id.
at 422.
CONCLUSION: Communications between a government lawyer and
a policy-maker can be privileged, where the lawyer is advising how to
bring a certain policy into compliance with the law. Id.
Glatzer v. Enron Corp., 475 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether “the docketing of a bankruptcy appeal that
does not comply with Bankruptcy Rule 8007 (“Rule 8007”) trigger[s] the
fifteen-day deadline for an appellant to file an opening brief set forth in
Bankruptcy Rule 8009 (“Rule 8009”).” Id.
ANALYSIS: The 2nd Circuit joined the 3rd and 4th Circuits, finding
that “[t]he notice requirement is an integral part of limitations periods
found throughout our rules of procedure and the bankruptcy code . . . .”
Id. The court further stated that “[a]s we will not condone an appellant’s
dilatory tactics in filing an appeal, we will not hold an appellant
accountable for a third party’s oversight that was beyond the appellant’s
knowledge and control.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “the fifteen-day period of Rule
8009(a)(1) is only triggered once the appeal has been docketed in the
district court and notice of the docketing of the appeal has been sent to
all parties.” Id.
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United States v. Mon-Leang Mui, No. 05-3512-cr, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 1166 (2d Cir. Jan. 18, 2007)
Editor’s Note—The Appellant’s “first three arguments present
issues of first impression in this Court.” Id. at *2.
QUESTION: Whether “the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in
submitting certain Sentencing Guidelines enhancements to the jury.” Id.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “[t]here is . . . no jurisdictional bar
to the use of special verdicts to obtain from a jury advisory findings
relevant to sentencing.” Id. at *3-4.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “it is undisputed that the district
court ultimately treated the jury’s Guidelines findings as advisory rather
than binding, consistent with the remedy decision in Booker.” Id. at *4.
QUESTION: Whether “the inclusion of Sentencing Guidelines
factors in [defendant’s] indictment, and the submission of that indictment
and those sentencing factors to the jury, constituted structural error
violative of his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.” Id.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “[t]he Guidelines factors
pleaded in the indictment and submitted to the jury as part of the charged
offenses are essentially surplusage.” Id. at *5. The court opined that
“[s]urplus pleadings do not alter the fundamental framework of the trial.
Certainly, they do not relieve the government of its critical obligation to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged offenses.”
Id. at *5-6. Furthermore, the court stated that “there could be no
confusion as to the government’s burden of proof with respect to the
actual elements of the charged offenses because the indictment
distinguished between those elements and the specified Guidelines
factors.” Id. at *6. The court continued by noting that “[f]urther, the
court’s charge instructed the jury to reach the issue of [the] Guidelines
factors only if it found the traditional elements proved.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “[t]he alleged pleading and
submission error [could] not be deemed structural because it [did] not
cast doubt on the reliability of the jury findings with respect to the actual
elements of the charged offenses or otherwise impugn[e] the integrity of
the ultimate verdict of guilty.” Id.
QUESTION: Whether the defendant’s
constitutionally ineffective.” Id. at *2.

“trial

counsel

was
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ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that the defendant “cannot show
that counsel’s failure to object to the Guidelines pleadings or charge was
objectively unreasonable given that . . . the Supreme Court in United
States v. Booker . . . conclude[d] that the Sixth Amendment required
[the] Guidelines ‘enhancing facts [to] be alleged in indictments and
proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at *11. Furthermore,
the defendant did not “point to any evidence that would have been
excluded if counsel had successfully objected to the challenged pleading
or submission of Guidelines factors to the jury. Id. at *13. The court also
noted that the defendant could not “demonstrate that an objection by
counsel to prosecution Guidelines arguments in summation would have
resulted in a different jury verdict or court sentence.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “counsel’s failure to object to the
Guidelines pleading or submission was [not] objectively unreasonable”
and that the defendant “fail[ed] to demonstrate the requisite prejudice.”
Id. at *12-13.
Tafari v. Hues, 473 F.3d 440 (2d Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “[W]hether an interlocutory appeal brought by a pro se
litigant prior to the entry of a final judgment below is ‘frivolous’ for the
purposes of revoking in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),
the ‘three strikes’ rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).”
Id. at 441.
ANALYSIS: The court reasoned that “a premature appeal is not
irremediably defective, and dismissal of such an appeal is not based on a
determination that it ultimately cannot succeed. Thus, [the court could
not] consider it ‘frivolous’ within the meaning of § 1915(g).” Id. at 443.
The court was “further convinced by the structure of the PLRA that §
1915(g) does not cast so broad a net as the district court held below.” Id.
The court also found that “designating a dismissal of this ilk as
‘frivolous’ fundamentally conflicts with the purposes of § 1915(g).” Id.
Finally, the court noted that “[s]tatements of the PLRA’s sponsors
further illustrate that it was designed to stem the tide of egregiously
meritless lawsuits, not those temporarily infected with remediable
procedural or jurisdictional flaws.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “that the PLRA’s ‘three strikes’
provision does not encompass a dismissal for filing a premature notice of
appeal.” Id. at 444.
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THIRD CIRCUIT
Fowler-Nash v. Democratic Caucus of
Representatives, 469 F.3d 328 (3d Cir. 2006)

the

Pa.

House

of

QUESTION: Whether the “alter ego” or functional test should be
applied “to claims of absolute legislative immunity” when a state
political caucus is sued after the firing of a legislative assistant. Id. at
329.
ANALYSIS: The court recognized that the “‘alter ego’ test lacks
precedential support from the Supreme Court, from our own Court, [and]
from other courts of appeals. Its adoption would open a circuit split.” Id.
Additionally, the court noted that the “‘alter ego’ approach is also a
poorer reflection of the purposes of legislative immunity than the
functional approach.” Id. The court also noted that its “own
jurisprudence regarding municipal personnel actions strongly suggests
that the Caucus should not be shielded by legislative immunity.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that a functional test applies “to
claims of absolute legislative immunity.” Id.
Hooven v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 465 F.3d 566 (3d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether “an employee’s severance benefit can be
grounded in, and enforceable based on, a unilateral contract outside of
ERISA’s remedial scheme.” Id. at 572-73.
ANALYSIS: In disagreeing with the district court’s analysis, the 3rd
Circuit held that “every claim for relief involving an ERISA plan must be
analyzed within the framework of ERISA.” Id. at 573. “ERISA requires
‘that any contractually accrued rights be discernible from the written
terms of the formal ERISA plan documents themselves.’” Id. The court
recognized that they may “occasionally employ unilateral contract
concepts in ERISA cases . . . ,” but that “[u]nilateral contract principles
may not operate to create extra-ERISA causes of action for plan
benefits.” Id.
CONCLUSION: In concluding that “[u]nilateral contract principles
may not operate to create extra-ERISA causes of action for plan
benefits,” the court observed that this holding “is consistent with the case
law on this issue.” Id.
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United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether a district court can “sentence below the
applicable Guidelines range for offenses involving crack cocaine.” Id. at
247.
ANALYSIS: “[A] sentencing court could err by applying the
Guidelines mandatorily (even though the resulting sentence was
calculated solely upon facts that were admitted by the defendant, found
by the jury, or based upon a prior conviction), as Booker makes them no
more than advisory.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “Post-Booker a sentencing court errs when it
believes that it has no discretion to consider the crack/powder cocaine
differential incorporated in the Guidelines—but not demanded by 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)—as simply advisory at step three of the post-Booker
sentencing process . . . .” Id. at 249.
Scarborough v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 461 F.3d 406 (3d
Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a claim secured by an interest in real
property that includes the debtor’s principal residence as well as other
income-producing rental property is ‘a claim secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal residence.’” Id. at
410-11.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “by using the word ‘is’ in the
phrase ‘real property that is the debtor’s principal residence,’ Congress
equated the terms ‘real property’ and ‘principal residence.’” Id. at 411.
The court explained that, “put differently, this use of “is” means that the
real property that secures the mortgage must be only the debtor’s
principal residence in order for the anti-modification provision to apply.”
Id. at 411.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a claim secured by real property
that is, even in part, not the debtor’s principal residence does not fall
under the terms of §1322(b)(2).” Id.
Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)
provision codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) stating that “a federal
appellate court ‘may accept an appeal’ from a remand order ‘if
application is made . . . not less than 7 days after entry of the order,’

476

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 3:461

should be interpreted . . . to mean ‘not more than 7 days after entry of the
order.’” Id. at 277.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “in that rare instance where it is
uncontested that legislative intent is at odds with the literal terms of the
statute, then a court’s primary role is to effectuate the intent of Congress
even if a word in the statute instructs otherwise.” Id. at 278. The court
first turned to the legislative history of § 1453 which stated that the
“[n]ew subsection 1453(c) provides discretionary appellate review of
remand orders under this legislation but also imposes time limits . . .
[and] parties must file a notice of appeal within seven days after entry of
a remand order.” Id. The court further noted that § 1453(c)(2) “instructs
an appellate court that it must dispose of the appeal within 60 days.” Id.
The court then extrapolated the effect of the statute as written, noting that
§ 1453(c)(1) “would grant [parties] the ability to . . . abuse the litigation
process because the party who loses on the district court’s remand ruling
could strategically wait to appeal the remand decision at any time pretrial.” Id. Observing the “pre-trial stage of class action cases usually lasts
many months or even years,” the court opined that so extending parties’
ability to appeal under § 1453 “contravenes the uncontested intent of the
statute.” Id. The court noted that the only other circuits to have
considered the question, the 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits, held that
imposing a “seven-day waiting period followed by a limitless window
for appeal” ran contrary to Congressional intent. Id. at 279. The 3rd
Circuit concluded the statute “needs common sense revision that
accurately reflects the uncontested intent of Congress,” and announced it
would therefore read § 1453(c)(1) to limit the time for appeal to seven
court days. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that, “in accord with the intent
of Congress, “ it would read § 1453(c)(1) of the Class Action Fairness
Act to require an application to appeal from a remand order be made “not
more than” 7 days after the entry of the order. Id.
Chao v Cmty. Trust Co., 474 F.3d 75 (3d Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether the definition of “person” under § 3401(4) of
the federal Right to Financial Privacy Act (“RFPA”) applies to trusts. Id.
at 81.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that a trust differs from corporations,
L.L.C., and other business structures. Id. at 81. The court further noted
that “[l]ooking to the equitable beneficiaries of a trust—the real parties in
interest—rather than to its legal owner is hardly a novel principle in trust
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law.” Id. at 81-82. The court rejected the argument that reading § 3401 to
include trusts presented a slippery slope; however, the court stated it was
“not inclined to carve out a ‘trust exception’ to the RFPA’s definition of
‘person’ solely on the principles the common law of trusts.” Id. The court
also indicated the argument for considering a trust a “person” under the
RFPA has no support in case law, and that the 3rd Circuit had previously
held itself bound by the RFPA’s unambiguous definition of “customer”
in holding that a corporation is not a “person.” Id. The court further
noted that the RFPA “requires a customer to hold both legal and
equitable title,” therefore disqualifying an entity that manages funds for
trusts beneficiaries without maintaining accounts in those beneficiaries’
names. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 3rd Circuit held that a trust is not a “person”
under the definition in § 3401(4) of the Right to Financial Privacy Act.
Id. at 82.
FIFTH CIRCUIT
Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether “specific personal jurisdiction [is] a claimspecific inquiry.” Id. at 274.
ANALYSIS: The court indicated that the difference that exists
“between general and specific jurisdiction” clearly indicates that specific
jurisdiction only arises when a defendant’s forum contacts are related to
the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 274-75. Allowing for specific jurisdiction to
be created, when forum contacts are not sufficient to establish general
jurisdiction, by forum contacts unrelated to the claim would be a
violation of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 275. When a plaintiff brings
multiple claims related “to different forum contacts of the defendant,
specific jurisdiction must be established for each claim.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Specific personal jurisdiction must be established by
forum contacts specific to each claim brought by a plaintiff. Id. at 274.
Darby v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 470 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether a cable service is classified as a utility for
purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 366, part of the Bankruptcy Code, which would
provide debtors with protection from having the service cut-off when the
debtor has filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 574.
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ANALYSIS: The court drew upon the decision of the bankruptcy
court in In re Moorefield. Id. The court agreed with the bankruptcy court
“that cable television is not a necessity as it is not necessary to a
minimum standard of living” and not within the scope of the services that
Congress sought to protect in passing § 366. Id. at 575.
CONCLUSION: The Fifth Circuit held that cable services are not a
utility under § 366. Id.
Lee v. Cytec Indus., Inc., 460 F.3d 673 (5th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether, in order for the statute of limitations to be
equitably tolled in a hybrid section 301 lawsuit under the Labor
Management Relations Act, the plaintiff, within six months of
displacement, must file a grievance with the union. Id. at 676.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “because some plaintiffs must
exhaust internal contractual remedies (e.g. the grievance process) before
suing, it would be unfair to say that the plaintiffs’ claim is barred by
limitations if, while the grievance is pending, the six-month federal
statute of limitations expires.” Id. However, the court instructed that
plaintiffs must first exhaust internal remedies and “cannot wait until the
statute of limitations for a federal lawsuit has passed and then file a
grievance to circumvent the applicable six-month statute.” Id. The court
further added that “tolling is applicable only for a ‘good faith’ attempt to
pursue non-judicial remedies” in order to resolve labor disputes. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that in order “to invoke equitable
tolling [in a hybrid section 301 lawsuit], an employee must file a
grievance with the union within six months of the adoption of a new
seniority system” Id. at 676.
Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 473 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether a school board that opens its meetings with
prayers under the legislative-prayer exception interpreting the
Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution nevertheless engages in
activities that are constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 191.
ANALYSIS: The 5th Circuit surveyed decisions from the United
States Supreme Court and other circuits in their treatment of deliberative
bodies that were allowed to conduct legislative prayers. Id. at 195-202.
Adopting the standard set forth in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783
(1983), the court held that the school board violated the Establishment
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Clause because it did not fit Marsh’s “narrow exception for nonsectarian
legislative invocations.” Id. at 199. The court found the opening prayers
constitutionally impermissible, notwithstanding case law that allowed
opening prayers by legislative bodies, because the school board at issue
selected only members of the Christian faith to lead prayers that
demonstrated “a clear preference for Christianity.” Id. at 204-05.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit affirmed the school board’s
violation of the Establishment Clause but vacated the permanent
injunction against all prayer and remanded the case back to the district
court for entry of an injunction consistent with the narrow quality of its
holding. Id. at 205.
Stanley v. Foster, 464 F.3d 565 (5th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether a reinstatement of a case pursuant to FED. R.
CIV. PROC. 60(b) has an effect on the running of the statute of
limitations. Id. at 568.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “when a case is reinstated the
applicable date for calculating the statute of limitations is the date of the
initial filing.” Id. at 568-69. The court noted that “this is not a new action
. . . the district court merely reopened the original case.” Id. at 569.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that when a case is reinstated
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. PROC. 60(b), the running of the statute of
limitations “should be calculated backward from the time the original
complaint was filed.” Id.
United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether taking an unusual amount of time to pull
over, coupled with nervous behavior by the driver, amounts to reasonable
suspicion to justify prolonged detention.” Id. at 404.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that “modest delay in stopping time
does not by itself . . . give rise to reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 405.
However, “there may be cases . . . in which further context, such as
erratic driving, acceleration, or passenger movement inside the vehicle
further suggest criminal behavior.” Id. In this case, the court found that
the government failed to prove that there was a reasonable suspicion to
justify prolonged detention because the defendant’s actions did not
“amount to ‘an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is
about to commit a crime’ as opposed to a mere hunch.” Id.

480

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 3:461

CONCLUSION: The court found that absent “evidence of a nexus
between [the defendant]’s allegedly suspicious behavior and any specific
criminal activity,” taking an unusual amount of time to pull over,
coupled with nervous behavior by the driver does not present a
reasonable suspicion to justify prolonged detention. Id.
United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646 (5th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether, and to what extent [the court should] apply
the Sixth Amendment standards to a waiver of the Rule 32.1(b) right to
counsel in the context of a revocation proceeding.” Id. at 650.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that “Rule 32.1(b) guarantees a
defendant in a proceeding to revoke parole, probation, or supervised
release, certain procedural protection—including the right to notice of
the right to counsel.” Id. at 651. However, the Rule is silent as to the
“appropriate standard by which to measure a defendant’s waiver of the
Rule’s protections.” Id. The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 9th
Circuits have all determined that the waiver of Rule 32.1(b) protections
must be “knowing and voluntary” as determined by a “totality of the
circumstances” analysis. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court adopted the “knowing and voluntary”
approach taken by the 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 9th Circuits and held that “the
waiver of a defendant’s Rule 32.1(b) rights is knowing and voluntary (1)
where there is a sufficient colloquy by the district court to assure an
understanding or freely made waiver; or (2) where the colloquy leaves
some uncertainty, the totality of the circumstances assures that the
waiver is knowing and voluntary.” Id. at 652.
SIXTH CIRCUIT
Kellici v. Gonzales, 472 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “Whether an alien’s habeas petition necessarily
challenges the merits of the underlying administrative order of removal
for purposes of jurisdiction under the REAL ID Act . . . .” Id. at 419.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[w]here a habeas case does not
address the final order, it is not covered by the plain language of the
Act.” Id. The court recognized that the 1st Circuit addressed this issue in
Hernandez v. Gonzales, holding that “where a petitioner challenged only
his continued detention in a habeas petition, rather than his removal, the
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case could not be transferred to the court of appeals pursuant to Section
106(c).” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court agreed with the reasoning of the 1st
Circuit and held that an alien’s habeas petition does not necessarily
challenge the merits of the administrative order of removal under the
REAL ID Act. Id.
Kline v. Gulf Ins. Co., 466 F.3d 450 (6th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a federally-prescribed form endorsement
attached to a trucking company’s insurance contract modifies the
attachment point of an umbrella policy when the endorsement was not
legally required in the first place.” Id. at 451.
ANALYSIS: At the outset, the court noted that the content of the
curiously, perhaps mistakenly attached federal endorsement form “is
ambiguous in the context of the umbrella policy to which it was allegedly
attached, and the form is best interpreted in light of the policies for which
it was created.” Id. After reviewing the language of the completed
endorsement form, the court concluded that “[t]he language of [the form]
as a whole . . . leads to the conclusion that Gulf did not change its
coverage when filling out the government-prepared form,” but “suggests
that Gulf intended to offer [the minimum] coverage only if the law
required such coverage.” Id. at 454-55. Recognizing that this was not the
only possible interpretation of the completed endorsement form,
however, the court buttressed its opinion on policy grounds: “Moreover,
public policy considerations do not warrant additional compensation, as
[the plaintiff] already received . . . more than the minimum federal
requirement. The ‘purpose of the [MCS-90] endorsement is to give full
security for the protection of the public (up to the limits prescribed).’” Id.
at 455. The court further explained that “[t]he federal government
balanced the need to compensate victims with the needs of industry and
determined the appropriate minimum compensation for members of the
public,” and thus the court should not entertain a reading of the
endorsement form that would disturb that balance and essentially
“rewrite the minimum compensation provisions.” Id. at 456.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that the attachment of “the
[federal endorsement] form did not require that the defendant insurance
company pay more than what was required under the original umbrella
insurance contract.” Id. at 451.
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United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether sexual offenses committed in 1988 “were too
remote in time to justify the imposition of a sex-offender-treatment
condition in 2005” as a supervised-release condition. Id. at 531.
ANALYSIS: The court looked to the 8th and 9th Circuits to
formulate a stance of its own. Id. The court noted that where the
“government presented no evidence that [the defendant] has a propensity
to commit any future sexual offenses, or that [he] has repeated this
behavior in any way since his . . . conviction [fifteen years prior]” special
conditions are not likely “to serve the goals of deterrence or public
safety, since the [sexually-offensive] behavior on which the special
conditions are based . . has ceased” Id. The court adopted the view that
“[s]upervised release conditions predicated upon twenty-year-old
incidents, [without evidence of any sexual misconduct since then], do not
promote the goals of public protection and deterrence” Id. at 531-32.
CONCLUSION: The court refused to dictate “precisely how much
time must elapse before a sex offense becomes too remote in time to be
reasonably related to a sex-offender condition” but held that in the
present case seventeen years was too remote. Id. at 532.
United States v. Allison Engine Co., 471 F.3d 610 (6th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether “a claim must have been paid or approved to
establish a violation” of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2). Id.
at 618.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit explained that to the knowledge of the
court, “no authority exists either supporting the proposition that a claim
must have been paid or approved to establish a violation of subsection
(a)(2) or rejecting it.” Id. The court held that the language of the statute
required that the claim must have already been paid by the government
before “an individual can be liable under the FCA for presenting a
fraudulent claim to the government.” Id. at 617.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that based on the
language of the statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) requires that a claim must
have already been paid by the government. Id. at 622.
United States v. Magouirk, 468 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a defendant who, through a valid plea
agreement . . . stipulates that the Guidelines will govern his sentence
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despite Booker, but . . . does not explicitly waive his general right to
appeal his sentence, nonetheless effectuates a waiver of his specific right
to appeal his sentence on the grounds of a Booker violation.” Id. at 950.
ANALYSIS: The 6th Circuit explained that “[a]t a very basic level,
the Guidelines afford defendants a degree of predictability that
the Booker discretionary scheme by definition cannot.” Id. at 951. The
court noted that a district court, moreover, will not necessarily impose a
more lenient sentence simply because the Guidelines are no longer
mandatory.” Id. The court noted that “[a]llowing the waiver of Booker
rights will give defendants an additional ‘tool,’ providing them with
another plea option that they will now be able to pursue with the
government.” Id. Accordingly, the 6th Circuit held that “a defendant may
voluntarily waive his or her Booker rights, provided that the waiver is
made ‘knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” Id. at 948. However,
the court also held that this would effectively waive a defendant’s “right
to appeal his sentence on the ground that the district court should have
considered the Guidelines as advisory only.” Id. at 951.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit concluded that a defendant may
voluntarily waive his or her Booker rights, but in doing so, the defendant
also waives his or her right to appeal a sentence on the ground that the
lower court “should have considered the Guidelines as advisory.” Id. at
951.
Pittsburgh & Conneaut Dock Co. v. Dir., 473 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “Whether the lack of a written recommendation (or any
recommendation at all) for the disposition of [a disability compensation]
controversy precludes fee liability under [33 U.S.C. § 928(b)].” Id. at
265.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that “[s]ubsection (b) sets forth the
requirements for fee liability when an employer voluntarily pays some
compensation but a dispute arises concerning additional compensation.”
Id. at 264. The court explained that subsection (b) requires the following
“in order for an employer to be liable for attorney’s fees: (1) an informal
conference addressing the disputed additional compensation; (2) a
subsequent written recommendation suggesting a disposition of the
controversy; (3) the employer’s rejection of the recommendation; and (4)
the claimant’s use of an attorney to secure an award of compensation
greater than the amount the employer was willing to pay.” Id. at 264-65.
The court found that “[t]he language of subsection (b) plainly states that
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in order for fees to be assessed under its terms there must be a written
recommendation containing a suggested disposition of the controversy.”
Id. at 266.
CONCLUSION: The court held that under 33 U.S.C. § 928(b), a
plaintiff “is not entitled to attorney’s fees . . . [if] there was no written
recommendation regarding the disposition of the controversy.” Id.
Van v. Jones, 475 F.3d 292 (6th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “Whether the [defendant]’s Sixth Amendment rights to
counsel and a fair trial were violated when the state court consolidated
his criminal trial with that of his co-defendants at a hearing . . . at which
[the defendant]’s attorney was not present.”
Id. at 293.
ANALYSIS: Noting its jurisdiction to review habeas appeals claims
de novo, where state courts have not addressed the issue involved, the
6th Circuit determined that the hearing did not constitute a “critical
stage” of the trial, since absence of counsel at the procedural step in
question did not prevent incurable prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 293,
315.
CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court and held that “a Michigan consolidation hearing is not a critical
stage and that the total absence of counsel at such a hearing does not
require that a writ of habeas corpus issue.” Id. at 293.
United States v. Wells, 473 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “[W]hether for purposes of recidivist sentencing under
the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), a prior adjudication
of juvenile delinquency is subject to characterization under the
‘categorical approach’ mandated for the review of prior adult convictions
by [Supreme Court precedent].” Id. at 642.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the government’s stance that the
defendant’s two prior adjudications of juvenile delinquency were
“violent felonies,” and consequently refused to consider the defendant as
an armed career criminal. Id. at 645, 649. The court favored a categorical
approach instead of a factual approach, because “district courts will
eliminate the need to examine facts relating to crimes sometimes
committed in the far distant past.” Id. at 649.

2007]

First Impressions

485

CONCLUSION: The 6th Circuit adopted the 3rd Circuit categorical
approach when considering prior juvenile convictions during sentencing
for new crimes. Id.
United Steelworkers of America v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 474
F.3d 271 (6th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a dispute over a side agreement that does
not provide for arbitration falls within the CBA’s arbitration clause.” Id.
at 278.
ANALYSIS: The court first recognized the circuit split that exists
over this issue. Id. The court noted then that the 2nd, 4th, and 8th
Circuits all utilize a collateral test to determine if a dispute concerning a
side agreement is arbitrable. Id. The court stated that “[u]nder the
collateral test, courts consider the similarity of the side agreement’s
subject matter to the subject matter of the CBA. If the subject matter is
dissimilar, the side agreement is deemed collateral to the CBA. However,
where the side agreement is ‘integral’ to the CBA, courts permit
arbitration of disputes over its provisions.” Id. The court then described
the “scope” test adopted by the 3rd, 7th, and 9th Circuits, that states
“unless the parties indicate otherwise, disputes over a side agreement are
arbitrable if the subject matter of the side agreement is within the scope
of the CBA’s arbitration clause.” Id. at 278-79.
CONCLUSION: The court adopted the “scope test as applied by the
Ninth Circuit.” Id. at 279.
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Conger, 474 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether de novo is “[t]he appropriate standard of
review to apply to a district court’s judgment on the administrative
record in an LTCSA [Long-Term Care Security Act, 5 U.S.C.S. §§ 90019009] eligibility dispute.” Id. at 263.
ANALYSIS: The court noted at the outset that, “[i]n the related arena
of ERISA benefit disputes, we review de novo a district court’s judgment
on the administrative record.” Id. Furthermore, “[n]either party offers an
argument for deviating from the de novo standard, nor do we see any
reason to do so.” Id.
CONCLUSION: Therefore, the court concluded, “we adopt the
ERISA standard and hold that we review de novo a district court’s
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judgment on the administrative record in an LTCSA eligibility dispute.”
Id.
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the term “provided” in 18 U.S.C. § 1347
means that services must be administered personally by the “Health
Service Provider in Psychology” (“HSPP”) or whether an HSPP may
delegate duties to any low level unlicensed clinic employee. Id. at 787.
ANALYSIS: The court first looked at the plain meaning of the statute
and deemed it to be clear and unambiguous. Id. Further, the court noted
that to find otherwise would produce an absurd result, allowing
practitioners to delegate the “lion’s share” of their work to unlicensed,
unqualified individuals. Id. at 787-88. The court added that Indiana
obviously knows how to authorize others to perform the services because
they have done so in other statutes. Id. at 787. The court stressed that in
all of those instances, the authorized employees were required to hold
specific qualifications and procure pre-approval from Medicaid. Id. at
788. Thus, the court found that had 18 U.S.C. § 1387 meant to include
employees other than the HSPP, it would have specified as much. Id.
CONCLUSION: “[T]he plain meaning of the words—that ‘Medicaid
will reimburse for . . . testing when provided by . . . an HSPP’—is that
the HSPP must be the person who is actually engaged in the conduct of
performing the tests.” Id. at 787.
Doe v. Smith, 470 F.3d 331 (7th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether solicitation of a minor for sex establishes the
attempt to commit sexual assault or molestation of a child. Id. at 344.
ANALYSIS: The court first defined attempt as requiring intent and a
substantial step toward committing the crime. Id. The court then stated
that most federal courts have construed attempt liberally, using discretion
on a case by case basis. Id. The court pinpointed how this circuit has
deemed solicitation of a minor to constitute a sexual act when construing
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. at 343. The court added that it
has also held in other contexts that solicitation can be a substantial step
toward committing the crime if strongly corroborative of the requisite
intent of the crime, or more than mere asking. Id. at 344. The court then
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addressed the fact that the 3rd and 8th Circuits have held that solicitation
is not a substantial step for purposes of attempt in sexual assault cases.
Id. at 344-45. On the contrary, the 6th, 10th and 11th Circuits have
consistently found the opposite in cybermolester cases. Id. at 345.
Ultimately, this circuit found persuasive the principle set forth in its
Immigration and Nationality Act cases that “there is an inherent risk of
exploitation when an adult solicits sex from a minor who, due to his or
her under-developed sense of judgment and susceptibility to coercion,
lacks the capacity to consent.” Id.
CONCLUSION: When a defendant solicits a child’s involvement in a
sex act, he takes a substantial step, and therefore, attempts to commit a
sexual assault on a minor. Id.
United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether substitute-billing is illegal under Indiana’s
Medicaid regulations,” or, more specifically, whether a requirement that
services be “‘provided’ [by the health service provider in psychology
(HSPP)] must be read to require that the services be ‘personally’
provided by the HSPP.” Id. at 786.
ANALYSIS: The court stated that, under Indiana law, “Medicaid will
reimburse for neuropsychological and psychological testing when
provided by a physician or an HSPP.” Id. at 787. Applying the wellsettled canon of statutory construction that “words [should be given]
their plain meaning unless doing so would frustrate the overall purpose
of the statutory scheme, lead to absurd results, or contravene clearly
expressed legislative intent,” the court found that the plain language of
the statute dictates “that the HSPP must be the person who is actually
engaged in the conduct of performing the tests.” Id. As such, the court
declined the defendant’s invitation “to read the word ‘provided’ as
synonymous with ‘furnished.’” Id. Furthermore, the court provided a
contextual basis for its conclusion, noting that “[t]he Indiana legislature
has demonstrated that when it chooses to allow so-called ‘mid-level
practitioners’ to perform some of the tasks that are billed by a
supervising provider it knows how to make this clear in the law.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that the practice of substitute-billing
is illegal under Indiana’s Medicaid regulations on the basis of the plain
meaning of the word “provided” and the specificity with which the
legislature delegated similar authority “[i]n those few instances where
Indiana is willing to allow mental health services to be administered by
third-parties under the direct supervision of the HSPP . . . .” Id. at 788.
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United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether a defendant charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1957
(engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified
unlawful activity) can be shown to have reached the threshold amount of
$10,000 or more in illegitimate funds when those illegitimate funds were
commingled with legitimate revenue. Id. at 791.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that it has dealt with the issue of
commingling of funds in similar cases involving money laundering. Id. at
791-92. In those cases, the court held that it would be counterintuitive to
assume that Congress intended for a defendant to escape liability by
simply commingling his illegitimate funds with his legitimate funds. Id.
After reviewing other circuits’ approaches to the issue, the court adopted
the 4th and 5th Circuits’ determination that because it is virtually
impossible to distinguish tainted from untainted funds, “the government
is not required to prove that no ‘untainted’ funds were involved, or that
the funds used in the transaction were exclusively derived from the
specified unlawful activity.” Id. at 792.
CONCLUSION: The court held that commingled funds can be
sufficient to establish the minimum $10,000 requirement for proving
“engagement in monetary transactions in property derived from specified
unlawful activity” cases. Id.
United States v. Lock, 466 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[H]ow and whether to count ‘loitering plus’ offenses
in a defendant’s criminal history score.” Id. at 598.
ANALYSIS: The court rejected the claim that the offense labeled
“Loitering-Illegal Drug Activity is not similar to—and is fundamentally
more serious than—‘simple loitering,’” and reasoned that “similarly
named offenses are in fact similar.” Id. at 602. The court added that both
target the same behavior and that the labels do “not change the fact that
the ordinances primarily prohibit loitering.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “convictions for LoiteringIllegal Drug Activity should be excluded from [a defendant’s] criminal
history score.” Id.

2007]

First Impressions

489

EIGHTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Kerr, 472 F.3d 517 (8th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the recommendations of sex offender
treatment during incarceration made by a district court, as part of
sentencing, are to be considered “final decisions” under 28 U.S.C. §
1291 for purposes of jurisdiction on appellate review. Id. at 520.
ANALYSIS: Defendant pleaded guilty to distribution and possession
of child pornography in violation of federal statute 18 U.S.C. §§
2252A(a)(1) and 2252A(a)(5)(B), respectively. Id. at 519. The district
court sentenced the defendant to 151 months in prison and ten years of
supervised release. Id. The district court imposed certain special
conditions on the supervised release as well as recommended sex
offender treatment while defendant is incarcerated. Id. The defendant
argued that the recommendations for treatment made by the district court
to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) should be vacated. Id. at 520. The
court noted that the recommendations of the district court to the BOP are
not binding and the issue of first impression is whether such
recommendations are “final decisions” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and thus
whether they are reviewable on appeal. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit joined with the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th
Circuits and held that “a non-binding recommendation to the BOP is not
reviewable as it is not a final decision of the district court.” Id.
United States v. Urqhart, 469 F.3d 745 (8th Cir 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the admission at trial of a Certificate of
Nonexistence of Record (“CNR”) violates a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation in light of Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004). Id. at 746.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the defendant illegally reentered
the United States from Canada after a prior deportation. Id. at 747. The
court acknowledged that during his encounter with law enforcement
authorities, a Special Agent of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement obtained the defendant’s “alien file.” Id. The court noted
that after a thorough review of the file itself, and the requisite databases,
the Acting Chief in the Records Services Branch issued a CNR “stating
that ‘after a diligent search’ of three databases, ‘no record was found to
exist indicating that [defendant] obtained consent . . . for re-admission in
the United States.’” Id. The court found, as a general principle, the
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admission of a CNR does not violate the constitutional right of
confrontation because the record is admissible under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(1) as an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 748. Recently,
however, the Supreme Court found in Crawford that the laws of evidence
do not define the scope of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Id. The court pronounced that “where testimonial evidence
is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands [a showing of]
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. The
Supreme Court left unanswered the question of what qualifies as
“testimonial” evidence. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 8th Circuit joined all other circuits in findings
that a CNR is “nontestimonial” evidence under Crawford and therefore it
does not trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment and is properly
admissible. Id. at 749.
NINTH CIRCUIT
CreAgri, Inc. v. USANA Health Sciences, Inc., 474 F.3d 626 (9th Cir.
2007)
QUESTION: Whether trademark priority requires not only use in
commerce, but also that such use in commerce is lawful. Id. at 630.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit acknowledged that “[i]t has long been
the policy of the PTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board that use in
commerce only creates trademark rights when the use is lawful.” Id. The
court noted two prevailing reasons for the lawful use requirement. Id.
First, “to hold otherwise would be to put the government in the
‘anomalous position’ of extending the benefits of trademark protection to
a seller based upon actions the seller took in violation of that
government’s own laws.” Id. Second, “as a policy matter, to give
trademark priority to a seller who rushes to market without taking care to
carefully comply with the relevant regulations would be to reward the
hasty at the expense of the diligent.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 9th Circuit “agree[d] with the PTO’s policy and
h[e]ld that only lawful use in commerce can give rise to trademark
priority.” Id. at 10.
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United States v. Lee, 472 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a person arrested in American Samoa for
allegedly committing federal crimes in American Samoa may be tried
and convicted in the United States District Court for the District of
Hawaii.” Id. at 639.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit examined 18 U.S.C. § 3238, which
mandates that “[t]he trial of all offenses . . . committed . . . out of the
jurisdiction of any particular state or district, shall be in the district in
which the offender . . . is first brought . . . .” Id. at 641. The court stated
that if American Samoa was a district for the purposes of § 3238, then
venue would be proper there, and not in Hawaii, but if American Samoa
was not a district, venue was proper in Hawaii, because that was the
district where the defendant was first brought after his arrest in American
Samoa. Id. at 644. The court found that “[a]lthough the term ‘district’ is
not defined in § 3238, Title 28 establishes the federal judicial ‘districts’
[and] American Samoa is not enumerated as a judicial ‘district’ among
those listed in Title 28. Id. Thus, it follows that American Samoa is not a
district pursuant to § 3238.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “We conclude that [defendant] was properly tried
and convicted in the Hawaii District Court for committing federal crimes
in American Samoa because . . . venue was proper in the District of
Hawaii under § 3238.” Id. at 645.
United States v. Combs, 470 F.3d 1294 (9th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “By what standard do we review a district court’s
determination, made during the course of an Ameline remand, that it
would have imposed the same sentence under an advisory Guidelines
system.” Id. at 1296.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit observed that “[t]he only guidance
Ameline gives is that, when the district judge determines that defendant’s
sentence would not have been materially different [than it would have
been if imposed after the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)], ‘the original sentence will stand, subject
to appellate review for reasonableness.’” Id. The court announced that
“there is an issue we can consider that bears on the reasonableness of the
sentence: Whether the district judge properly understood the full scope of
his discretion in a post-Booker world.” Id. at 1297.
CONCLUSION: “The record here discloses that the judge understood
his post-Booker authority to impose a non-Guidelines sentence and that
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his ultimate determination was therefore not infected by ignorance or a
misapprehension of the law.” Id.
United States v. Tuff, 469 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether “an employee [who] exercises a non-qualified
stock option granted by the employer to purchase shares with money
borrowed from a third party, pledging the shares as collateral for the
loan, [has] ‘transferred’ and ‘substantially vested’ [the property] for tax
purposes at the time the option is exercised, or at the time the shares are
later liquidated.” Id. at 1251.
ANALYSIS: The court began its analysis with an “overview of the
statutory and regulatory provisions governing the taxation of stock
options. . . .” Id. These provisions provide that the receipt of a nonqualified stock option with no “readily ascertainable fair market value”
to an employee “generally is not taxable.” Id. However, the provisions
further provide that this will become a taxable event upon the satisfaction
of two conditions: “First, the shares must be transferred to the
employee,” and “[s]econd, they must be substantially vested in the
employee.” Id. at 1251-52. In addition, these provisions include an
exception that allows the income to not be “recognized when a ‘transfer’
of property occurs by treating the exercise of some stock options as the
grant of another option, rather than a transfer of shares.” Id. at 1252. The
court rejected appellant’s argument to apply this exception, and observed
these arguments to be “nonsense.” Id. at 1253. Because appellant had
satisfied the two conditions requiring the taxation of a non-qualified
stock option and because no exceptions were available, the court
affirmed the lower court’s decision holding that this was a taxable event.
Id. at 1250.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “a taxable transfer of property
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 83 occurred each time [appellant]
exercised his [non-qualified stock] options” and not when the shares are
later liquidated. Id. at 1255.
ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784 (9th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the use of portable tables to distribute
literature is protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 798.
ANALYSIS: The court found that “use of portable tables is
analogous to access to newsracks—similarly temporary structures used
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to disseminate speech-related materials —which is protected by the First
Amendment.” Id. at 799.
CONCLUSION: “[T]he erection of tables in a public forum is
expressive activity protected by our Constitution to the extent that the
tables facilitate the dissemination of First Amendment speech.” Id.
Quicksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta Corp., 466 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “Whether tacking [an earlier trademark to a subsequent
one] is an issue of law or fact . . . .” Id. at 759.
ANALYSIS: In a trademark dispute that applies the tacking doctrine,
“a mark owner ‘essentially seeks to ‘tack’ his first use date in the earlier
mark onto the subsequent mark.’” Id. at 758. The 9th Circuit noted that
only the Federal and 6th Circuits have addressed this issue of tacking,
“and both consider tacking a legal question for the court.” Id. The other
circuits arrived at this conclusion by analogizing tacking to the
“likelihood of confusion” doctrine, which has been treated as a question
of law. Id. The court noted that “in contrast, [the 9th Circuit has]
analyzed likelihood of confusion as a question of fact.” Id. Therefore, the
issue of tacking “should also be analyzed as a question of fact.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “[B]ecause [the 9th Circuit has] analyzed the
analogous consideration of likelihood of confusion as a factual question,
whether tacking applies should also be analyzed as a question of fact.”
Id.
United States. v. Rowland, 464 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether methamphetamine arriving in Guam on a
flight originating in Hawaii is ‘imported into Guam’ with the meaning of
the [Guam Customs officer] statutory scheme.” Id. at 904.
ANALYSIS: The court was presented with defendant’s argument that
“drugs ‘imported into Guam’ must arrive in Guam from a foreign
country,” and that because defendant’s “flight was a nonstop, domestic
flight . . . the Guam Customs officers lacked statutory authority to stop
and question him . . . .” Id. “When a word is defined in a statute, ‘courts
are not at liberty to look beyond the statutory definition.’” Id. at 905. The
court reasoned that since the statute in question defined the term
“import,” the statute, then, “prohibits bringing any controlled substance
into Guam, regardless of whether the substance comes from a foreign
country or from the United States.” Id. The court continued, “even if we
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were not convinced by the plain language of the statute, we would reach
the same conclusion based on the structure of Guam customs law.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that “it is clear that Guam
Customs officers have the statutory authority to stop and question an
individual suspected of smuggling drugs into Guam, so long as the
person is arriving from outside of Guam.” Id. at 907.
United States v. Ressam, 474 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 844(h)(2) “criminalize[s] carrying
an explosive during the commission of another felony, or . . .
criminalize[s] carrying an explosive during and in relation to that other
felony.” Id. at 601.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit noted that it “interpreted a similar
provision in the firearms statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), in United States v.
Stewart.” Id. at 602. In Stewart, the court determined that the addition of
the language “during and in relation to” to § 924(c) implied that “a
relation between the firearm and the underlying felony was required.” Id.
at 11. The Stewart court further stated that “the evident purpose of the . .
. statute was to impose more severe sanctions where firearms facilitated,
or had the potential of facilitating, the commission of a felony. That
purpose necessarily implies some relation or connection between the
underlying criminal act and the use or possession of the firearm.” Id. at
12.
CONCLUSION: The court applied this interpretation to § 844(h)(2)
and determined that the omission of the language “in relation to” did not
preclude a relational element because, like § 924(c), § 844(h)(2)
contained an implied relational element that the explosive was used in
the commission of the underlying felony. Id. at 16.
United States v. Hernandez-Castro, 473 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: “Whether, following the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Booker, the United States Sentencing Guidelines are
advisory for purposes of calculating criminal history points under §
3553(f)(1).” Id. at 1005.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit stated that “[§] 3553(f)(1) is not, by
virtue of its reference to the Sentencing Guidelines, rendered advisory by
Booker.” Id. at 1006. The 9th Circuit explained that the Supreme Court
decided in Booker that mandatory sentencing guidelines were
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unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment, but held that “the
remainder of the [Sentencing Guidelines] Act satisfies the Court’s
constitutional requirements” and therefore remained intact. Id. at 1007.
Applying these principles, the court determined that “[§] 3553(f)(1) falls
squarely within the ‘remainder of the Act’ that is unaffected by Booker”
because “[i]n calculating criminal history points . . . the district court is
simply ascertaining prior convictions, a determination that passes
constitutional scrutiny.” Id.
CONCLUSION: “[W]e join our sister circuits in holding that Booker
left in tact the requirement of § 3553(f)(1) that a defendant ‘not have
more than 1 criminal history point.’” Id. at 1005.
United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: First, “whether § 3582(c)(2) proceedings fall within the
scope of Booker. Second, if they fall within Booker’s ambit, . . . whether
policy statements by the Sentencing Commission nonetheless preclude
the application of Booker to § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 1169.
ANALYSIS: The court explained that, after Booker, the sentencing
system is no longer mandatory and therefore “district courts are
necessarily endowed with the discretion to depart from the Guidelines
when issuing new sentences under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 1170. Thus, the
court stated that while § 3582(c)(2) proceedings fall within the scope of
Booker, resentencing is not because of Booker, but instead the
resentencing entitlement is based on § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 1171. The court
acknowledged that the Guidelines may be unfavorable to a discretionary
scheme, but declared that the Guidelines should be viewed in an advisory
fashion. Id. at 1172. The court announced that “under Booker, to the
extent that the policy statements would have the effect of making the
Guidelines mandatory (even in the restricted context of § 3582(c)(2)),
they must be void.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “[b]ecause Booker abolished the
mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines in all contexts, and
because reliance on its holding is not inconsistent with any applicable
policy statement, . . . [the court held] that Booker applies to § 3582(c)(2)
proceedings” and that the policy statements do not preclude application
of Booker to § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 1169.
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United States v. Fort, 472 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether “local police reports . . . qualify for the Rule
16(a)(2) exemption and [if so, whether] they are, therefore, discoverable
materials under FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E).” Id. at 1110.
ANALYSIS: The court began by reviewing the text of Rule 16 and
found that “written police reports . . . are ‘documents’ within the
‘possession, custody, or control’ of the federal prosecutor and that they
are ‘material to preparing the defense.’” Id. The court, therefore, held
that “the reports are discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1)(E) unless
exempted by Rule 16(a)(2).” Id. The court next found it necessary to
ascertain “what is meant by ‘government agent’ and ‘the case,’” and
determined that the Advisory Committee notes suggested that
“‘government agent’ includes non-federal personnel whose work
contributes to a federal criminal ‘case.’” Id. at 1110-13. Emphasizing a
support for a symmetrical reading of the discovery obligations of Rule
16, the court stated that since the “federal prosecution is a direct
outgrowth of investigations by local authorities,” covering the same
conduct that the defendants were charged with in the federal indictment,
“[f]or all practical purposes, including the application of Rule 16(a)(2),
this local investigation and federal prosecution should be considered one
‘case.’” Id. at 1114, 1119. The court explained that holding otherwise,
“thereby making underlying local or state investigatory files subject to
pre-trial discovery by a subsequently federally indicted defendant, would
in all likelihood inhibit cooperation between local and federal law
enforcement agencies, to the benefit of criminals but to the detriment of
the public good.” Id. at 1119.
CONCLUSION: The court held that “Rule 16(a)(2) extends to . . .
[local] police reports created prior to federal involvement but
relinquished to federal prosecutors to support a unified prosecution of
Defendants for the same criminal activity that was the subject of the local
investigation.” Id. at 1119-20. The court explained that “[t]hese types of
documents have always been protected under federal law if compiled by
federal officers” and therefore the court declared that there was no reason
“why the law should be any different in a federal prosecution regardless
of who gathered the statements.” Id. at 1120.
Zi-Xing Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether “8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) precludes an alien
who has been removed from the United States from filing a motion to
reopen those removal proceedings.” Id. at 981.

2007]

First Impressions

497

ANALYSIS: The court examined the regulation and noted that it is
“phrased in the present tense and so by its terms applies only to a person
who departs the United States while he or she ‘is the subject of removal
. . . proceedings.’” Id. at 982. The court explained that “[b]ecause
petitioner’s original removal proceedings were completed when he was
removed to China, he did not remain the subject of removal proceedings
after that time.” Id. Thus, the court determined that “[w]hile the
regulation may have been intended to preclude aliens in petitioner’s
situation from filing motions to reopen their completed removal
proceedings, the language of the regulation does not unambiguously
support this result.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court construed the ambiguity in favor of the
petitioner and against the government, holding that 8 C.F.R. §
1003.23(b)(1) does not preclude an alien who has been removed from the
United States from filing a motion to reopen those removal proceedings.
Id.
Af-Cap Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080 (9th
Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether, under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1610, the court can
determine if the “property was used for a commercial activity in the
United States by examining the entire underlying activity that generated
the property in question.” Id. at 1087.
ANALYSIS: The property of a foreign state is immune to attachment
by courts in the United States, unless they are “used for a commercial
activity in the United States”. Id. The court chose to read the statute
narrowly, agreeing with the 5th Circuit’s ruling that “Subsection (a)
regarding property belonging directly to a foreign state, permits
execution only narrowly, when the property is ‘in the United States’ and
‘used for a commercial purpose in the United States.’” Id. at 1088.
CONCLUSION: The court ruled “that property is ‘used for a
commercial activity in the United States’ when the property in question
is put into action, put into service, availed or employed for a commercial
activity, not in connection with a commercial activity or in relation to a
commercial activity.” Id. at 1091.
J&G Sales, Ltd. v. Truscott, 473 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: Whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives has the statutory authority to send demand letters to
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federal firearms licensees requiring them to provide specified record
information. Id. at 1047.
ANALYSIS: The court found that the plain language of the statute
clearly authorizes the Bureau to issue demand letters. Id. at 1048.
Further, the court noted, the other parts of the statute did not generally
limit the Bureau’s right to issue demand letters, but instead restricted
letters and investigations under certain circumstances. Id. at 1049-51.
CONCLUSION: The court found the statute to be clear and, with
guidance from the 4th Circuit, accepted the plain reading of the statute
that the Bureau has the authority to send demand letters to Federal
firearms licensees. Id. at 1047-48.
United States v. Combs, 470 F.3d 1294 (9th Circuit 2006)
QUESTION: “By what standard do we review a district court’s
determination, made during the course of an Ameline remand, that it
would have imposed the same sentence under an advisory Guidelines
system.” Id. at 1296.
ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit examined Ameline and found that the
court would review for reasonableness, a district judge’s determination,
that a sentence under the advisory Guidelines would not be materially
different. Id. However, because the sentencing was done under a limited
Ameline remand, the court stated that the reasonableness review was very
different than one conducted on post-Booker sentences. Id. The court
noted that such a review only takes place if the district judge determines
on his review that “the sentence would have been materially different
under an advisory Guidelines system.” Id. at 1296-97. The court stated
that its reasonableness review is thus based on “[w]hether the district
judge properly understood the full scope of his discretion in a postBooker world.” Id. at 1297.
CONCLUSION: The court found that the record indicated that the
district judge did understand his authority under the post-Booker regime
and therefore his decision to allow the original sentence to stand was
reasonable under Ameline. Id.
Snow-Erlin v. United States, 470 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2006).
QUESTION: “Whether a claim for negligent miscalculation of a
release date arises out of false imprisonment for purposes of the [Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)].” Id. at 808.
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ANALYSIS: The 9th Circuit indicated that the sovereign immunity
of the United States is waived under the FTCA for certain torts, but that
claims “arising” from false imprisonment are exempt under the statute.
Id. While the plaintiff in this case brought a claim of negligence, the
court stated that “[t]his circuit looks beyond the labels used to determine
whether a proposed claim is barred [under § 2680(h)].” Id. The plaintiff’s
only claim was that the United States held her deceased husband for
longer than his sentence. Id. at 808-09. The court stated that the
“exclusion of false imprisonment claims” cannot be avoided by raising
another claim connected to that false imprisonment. Id.
CONCLUSION: The court held that a claim for negligent
miscalculation of a release date arising out of false imprisonment is
excluded under the FTCA, and thus barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
Id.
TENTH CIRCUIT
Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether an unincorporated association is a ‘person’
for the purposes of Section 1983.” Id. at 1213.
ANALYSIS: The court considered “(1) the legislative history of
Section 1983, (2) the general understanding, as of 1871, regarding the
legal personality of unincorporated associations, and (3) the Dictionary
Act of 1871.” Id. The court found “no indication within the legislative
history of Section 1983 that Congress considered the term ‘persons’ to
include unincorporated associations,” and noted that “there was no
general understanding in 1871, when the precursor to Section 1983 was
passed, that unincorporated associations should be treated as natural
persons.” Id. Lastly, the court proffered that “while the Dictionary Act of
1871 extended the meaning of ‘person’ to include corporations and
municipalities, it did not do the same for unincorporated associations.”
Id. at 1214.
CONCLUSION: The court held an unincorporated association is not
a “person” entitled to bring a claim under § 1983. Id. at 1216.
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United States v. Pettigrew, 468 F.3d 626 (10th Cir. 2006)
Editor’s Note: This 10th Circuit opinion substituted the original
opinion in Unite States v. Pettigrew, 455 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2006),
which was summarized in Issue Number 1 of this Volume.
QUESTION: “[W]hether a pre-warning confession, not itself a
violation of Miranda, but obtained subsequent to two violations of
Miranda, must be suppressed.” Id. at 634.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the “unwarned confession taken in
violation of Miranda must be suppressed, but it does not necessarily
follow that every subsequent voluntary statement made by a suspect must
be suppressed as well.” Id. at 635. Additionally, the court stated that
“Miranda itself recognized that any statement given freely and
voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in
evidence.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The court joined “the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in
holding that the admissibility of an unsolicited inculpatory statement,
following a voluntary statement made in violation of Miranda, turns on
whether the inculpatory statement was knowingly and voluntarily made.
In the absence of coercion or improper tactics, a broader rule would
undercut the twin rationales of Miranda’s exclusionary rule—
trustworthiness and deterrence.” Id. at 636.
Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether a court should apply the law of the forum or
the law of the jurisdiction chosen by the parties to interpret a forumselection clause in an international commercial agreement. Id. at 427.
ANALYSIS: The 10th Circuit examined the issue of what law should
apply when interpreting a forum-selection clause in an international
agreement that contains a choice-of-law clause. Id. at 427. The court
observed, however, that “when a court interprets a contract, as a general
matter it applies the law that the parties selected in their contract” in
accordance with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS.
Id. The court noted that “two ‘prime objectives’ of contract law are ‘to
protect the justified expectations of the parties and to make it possible for
them to foretell with accuracy what will be their rights and liabilities
under the contract.’” Id. at 428. The court observed that “[w]e see no
particular reason, at least in the international context, why a forumselection clause . . . should be singled out as a provision not to be
interpreted in accordance with the law chosen by the contracting parties.”
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Id. The court noted that “Supreme Court opinions in international
disputes emphasize the primacy of the parties’ agreement regarding the
proper forum” and that “[t]he words [of a forum-selection provision]
may take on different meanings depending on the law used to interpret
them.” Id. The court noted further that “when the contract contains a
choice-of-law clause, a court can effectuate the parties’ agreement . . .
only if it interprets the forum clause under the chosen law.” Id.
CONCLUSION: The 10th Circuit held that “when an international
commercial agreement has both choice-of-law and forum-selection
provisions, the forum-selection provision must ordinarily be interpreted
under the law chosen by the parties.” Id. at 421.
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Milkintas, 470 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether the government, having been provided
notice that a defendant is willing to provide information about a crime, is
under any obligation to solicit that information from a defendant.” Id. at
1345.
ANALYSIS: Section 2D1.1(b)(7) of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines provide for a two-level reduction in a defendant’s offense
level for certain delineated offenses, if certain safety-valve criteria are
met under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Id. at 1344. At issue in this case is
the fifth criterion: the defendant must “truthfully provide[] to the
Government all information and evidence the defendant has concerning
the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of
a common scheme or plan.” Id. at 1345. The 11th Circuit has held that a
defendant seeking to take advantage of this provision bears the burden of
proving eligibility for safety-valve relief.” Id. The court noted that “[a]ll
circuits . . . have held [that] the government is under no obligation to
solicit information from defendants who seek to satisfy [the statutory]
requirement to provide information.” Id. at 1345.
CONCLUSION: The court concluded that a mere willingness to
provide information is insufficient to meet the criterion. Id. Further, the
court ruled that “[a]cting in good faith is a necessary condition for
satisfying the safety-valve criteria, not a sufficient one” and the
defendant is required to “come forward and truthfully supply all the
information that he possesses about his involvement in the offense.” Id.
at 1346.
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Stephens v. Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “[W]hether a district court abuses its discretion when it
accepts an argument that had not been presented to the magistrate judge.”
Id. at 1176.
ANALYSIS: In analyzing whether a district court can accept an
argument not considered by a magistrate judge, the court emphasized the
magistrate judge’s subordinate position when rendering dispositive
motions: “[w]hen a district court refers a dispositive motion to a
magistrate judge for a report and recommendation, the district court
retains, as a statutory and a constitutional matter, broad discretion over
the report and recommendation.” Id. The court further highlighted that
“under the Federal Magistrates Act, ‘the magistrate [judge] has no
authority to make a final and binding’ ruling on a dispositive motion,”
and that “[e]ven if no objections to the findings or recommendations
have been filed, the district court may undertake ‘further review . . . , sua
sponte or at the request of a party, under a de novo or any other
standard.’” Id. As such, the court ruled that “[i]n the light of [such] broad
discretion, [a] district court [i]s not barred from considering an argument
. . . that had not been presented to the magistrate judge.” Id. Finally, the
court rejected the argument that “the district court performed an appellate
function . . . [by] considering an argument not raised before the
magistrate judge,” pointing out that “the relationship between district
courts and magistrate judges differs significantly from the relationship
between appellate courts and district courts.” Id. The court opined that a
“‘magistrate judge has no authority to make a final and binding’ ruling
on a dispositive motion, and a district court ‘may . . . receive further
evidence’ when it reviews the report and recommendation of a magistrate
judge.” Id. at 1176-77. The court recognized that this holding was at
odds with those of the 1st and 9th Circuits. Id.
CONCLUSION: A “district court [does] not abuse its discretion by
accepting [an] . . . argument” that was not brought before the magistrate
judge. Id. at 1176.
Gulfcoast Med. Supply v. Sec’y, Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs.,
468 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services may require a durable medical equipment supplier to
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submit additional evidence that its equipment is medically necessary
under Part B of the Medicare Act. Id. at 1348.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that the auditing provisions of Part B
within the Medicare Act indicated that “Congress unambiguously
contemplated the Secretary’s authority to require suppliers to submit
medical documentation beyond a CMN [Certificate of Medical
Necessity] to prove medical reasonableness and necessity.” Id. at 1352.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that not permitting additional evidence
of medical necessity would deny the Secretary the power to refuse claims
with certificates signed by dishonest or incompetent physicians. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 5th Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court and held that “when the Medicare Act is read as a whole, it
unambiguously permits carriers and the Secretary to require suppliers to
submit evidence of medical necessity beyond a CMN.” Id.
Mingkid v. Att’y Gen., 468 F.3d 763 (11th Cir. 2006)
QUESTIONS: “[W]hether the [Immigration Judge] may make a
frivolity finding notwithstanding a determination that the asylum
application is time-barred” and whether the circuit court had independent
jurisdiction to review a [Board of Immigration Appeal]’s frivolity
determination when the petitioner concede[d] both removability and a
failure to establish eligibility for asylum.” Id. at 766.
ANALYSIS: The court cited Section 240 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act and specific agency regulations to conclude that the
backdrop of statutes and regulations did not contain any prohibition to
bar an Immigration Judge’s authority to make a determination that the
untimely application for asylum at issue was frivolous. Id. at 768. The
11th Circuit acknowledged Article III of the U.S. Constitution as the
source of the court’s power to determine if it had jurisdiction over the
frivolity determination, and reasoned that it had jurisdiction since its
opinion would not be advisory and could afford the petitioners
immediate relief. Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit declared that the Immigration
Judge had jurisdiction to make a frivolity finding and the circuit court
had jurisdiction to review such a determination. Id. at 766.

504

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 3:461

United States v. Linh Pham, 463 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1B1.8
prohibits the government’s use of “statements and information obtained
pursuant to [the defendant’s] plea and cooperation or from sources
provided by [the defendant] and previously unknown to the government”
in determining the defendant’s sentence. Id. at 1243.
ANALYSIS: The court looked to other circuits for guidance on this
question and noted that the 3rd Circuit has held that “the use of
information post-dating the agreement and obtained from independent
sources is not barred.” Id. Also, “[i]nformation separately gleaned from
co-defendants is also fair game.” Id. However, “the government may not
evade U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8(a) where the evidence was elicited solely as a
result of, or prompted by, the defendant’s cooperation.” Id. at 1243-44.
CONCLUSION: The court “conclude[d] that, so long as the
information is obtained from independent sources or separately gleaned
from codefendants, it may be used at sentencing without violating
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.8.” Id. at 1244.
Tmesys, Inc. v. Eufaula Drugs, Inc., 462 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: “Whether [the court] ha[s] jurisdiction to review an
order remanding a case based on a finding that CAFA does not apply and
what law controls as to when an action has ‘commenced’ for purposes of
CAFA.” Id. at 1319.
ANALYSIS: The court did not conduct any analysis in the opinion,
but stated that it had “already received briefing from all parties on the
jurisdictional issue and is ruling only on that threshold issue.” Id. at 1319
n.1.
CONCLUSION: The court found that it had “jurisdiction to review a
district court’s order to remand when that order is based on a
determination that CAFA does not apply, at least to the extent of
reexamining that jurisdictional issue.” Id. at 1319. The court noted that
“as to the second issue, the consensus among circuits is that state law
determines when an action is commenced for purposes of CAFA.” Id.
United States v. Williams, 469 F.3d 963 (11th Cir. 2006)
QUESTION: Whether, “in order to commit a violation of [21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)] . . . after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug
offense have become final, [defendant] must have been involved in
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transactions totaling five kilograms or more of cocaine after his second
prior conviction became final.” Id. at 966.
ANALYSIS: The court noted that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) states, in
relevant part, that “[i]f any person commits a violation of this
subparagraph . . . after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug
offense have become final, such person shall be sentenced to a
mandatory term of life imprisonment without release.” Id. The court
agreed with the 6th Circuit’s reasoning in a similar case in which the
defendant was “charged with a single, ongoing conspiracy [which h]e
committed . . . every day over the life of the agreement, and the timing of
each separate overt act is not controlling.” Id. The 6th Circuit concluded
that “the violation involved more than 50 grams of cocaine base.
Therefore, the district court properly applied the statutory sentence
mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A).” Id. at 966-67. The 11th Circuit
then turned to “[t]he nature of a conspiracy” to support is holding. Id. at
967. The court noted that “[t]he gist of the crime of conspiracy . . . is the
agreement or confederation of the conspirators to commit one or more
unlawful acts,” not “the commission of the crime which it contemplates.”
Id.
CONCLUSION: The 11th Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument
and held that the defendant’s “continued participation in a single
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine after his second prior conviction became
final triggered the mandatory minimum term of life imprisonment under
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii).” Id.
Odili v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 474 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007)
QUESTION: What is the proper standard of review of a parole
board’s role assessment determination in a transfer treaty hearing. Id. at
1260.
ANALYSIS: The 11th Circuit noted that the court has “long and
repeatedly held that a district court’s determination of a defendant’s role
in the offense is a finding of fact to be reviewed only for clear error.” Id.
at 1260. The court held that a parole board’s determination of role
assessment in a transfer treaty hearing should similarly be reviewed for
clear error. Id. The court recognized that the 5th, 7th, and 9th Circuits
had reached similar conclusions. Id.
CONCLUSION: “Given that a transfer treaty hearing is the
functional equivalent of a sentencing hearing, the ‘clear error’ standard
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for review of a district court’s role assessment determination applies with
equal force to the review of such a determination made by the Parole
Commission in [this] context.” Id.

